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Abstract: The recognition of the seriousness and transboundary impacts of environmental crime has led to the adoption of 
specific legislative initiatives to combat environmental crime at both the international and European level. Yet although the 
EU member states have adopted successfully in 2008 a legal framework for harmonisation of environmental criminal law, the 
1998 Council of Europe environmental crime convention has so far not entered into force, even more than fifteen years since 
its adoption. This paper examines the legal implications in a scenario in which a EU member state becomes bound by both 
the Council of Europe and the EU environmental crime instruments. In particular, it examines the extent to which the 
Council of Europe instrument could affect the EU common rules or alter their scope, thus hindering the external powers of 
the EU member states to ratify and negotiate independently the Council of Europe convention. This paper also discusses 
the extent to which the legality of the EU environmental crime directive may be effectively challenged in light of multilateral 
environmental agreements. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper aims to examine the external dimensions of EU environmental crime legislation. In 
particular, it discusses the relationship between the EU directive on environmental criminal law 
adopted in October 20081and the 1998 Council of Europe convention on environmental criminal law2 
from the perspective of the EU external relations; as well as the extent to which the legality of EU 
environmental crime legislation may be challenged for incompatibility with international 
environmental agreements. Although both the EU and Council of Europe environmental crime 
instruments have been the subject of academic analysis and debate in their own right, there has been 
little academic analysis of the legal relationship between the two instruments, particularly from the 
perspective of the EU external relations. In this context, the relationship between EU environmental 
crime legislation and international environmental agreements will also be examined. 
 This paper will initially assess whether the EU member states remain competent to adopt and 
negotiate the 1998 Council of Europe environmental crime convention following the adoption of the 
EU environmental crime directive in October 2008. Secondly, this paper assesses the extent to which 
specific provisions of the Council of Europe environmental crime convention are compatible with the 
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EU environmental crime directive, as this could affect the ability of the EU member states to adopt 
and negotiate independently the Council of Europe environmental crime convention. The last section 
of this paper discusses the extent to which the legality of EU environmental crime legislation may be 
challenged for incompatibility with international environmental agreements.  
THE ADOPTION OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME CONVENTION AND THE 
EU ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME DIRECTIVE 
In the early 1990s there were calls for a comprehensive treaty addressing the growing evidence of the 
costs and risks associated with environmental criminality. In the seventeenth Conference of European 
Ministers of Justice (Istanbul, 1990) adopted Resolution No. 1, leading the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe to set In 1991 a new select committee of experts on the protection of the 
environment through criminal law, leading to the decision by the Committee to draft a binding 
international Treaty.3 The Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of the Environment 
through Criminal Law was adopted on 4 November 1998 in Strasbourg (hereinafter, ‘Council of 
Europe/CoE environmental crime convention’).4 It was the first international treaty to require more 
broadly the criminalisation of a number of offences causing or likely to cause environmental damage.5 
 The Council of Europe environmental crime convention aims at criminalising environmental harm 
and harmonising environmental criminal offences and administrative infringements and penalties. The 
Council of Europe’s treaty for a harmonised system of environmental criminal law flows from the 
idea that criminal law is essential in order to strengthen the protection of the environment, whilst also 
recognising the effectiveness of other penalties, in particular administrative penalties. In this vein, the 
Convention aims to establish a minimum standard for a common criminal policy on the protection of 
the environment. At the time of writing, the Council of Europe Convention has not reached the 
minimum number of ratifications required for it to enter into force. It has only attracted one 
ratification by Estonia on 26 April 2002 and a total of fourteen signatures.6 Since the convention 
requires three ratifications for it to enter into force,7 it remains inoperative. 
 In the European Union setting, following a major constitutional challenge regarding the legal basis 
for the EU legislative initiatives to combat environmental crime,8 in February 2007 Commission 
                                                
3 The draft Convention and explanatory memorandum were approved by the European Committee on Crime 
Problems (CDPC) and adopted by the Committee of Ministers on June/September 1996.   
4 Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law, ETS no. 172, 4 
November 1998 (not yet in force). 
5 See also, F. Comte,‘Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law: Destiny of the Various European Union’s 
Initiatives’ in Odina, Marco (ed.) Europe and the Environment (Europa Law Publishing, Groningen, 2004) at 46. 
6 See http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=172&CM=8&DF=3/8/2007&CL=ENG 
(accessed on 10 February 2015). The states that have signed the convention at the time of writing are: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Romania, Sweden and Ukraine. 
7 Article 13 (3) states that the Convention shall enter into force following the period of three months after the date on 
which three States have expressed their consent to be bound by the convention. 
8 See Case C-176/03 (‘Environmental Crimes’) and Case C-440/05 (‘Ship-Source Pollution’). 
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presented a proposal for a Directive on environmental crimes9 based on former Article 175 EC (post-
Lisbon, Article 192 TFEU), superseding the original 2001 environmental crime directive proposal.10 
The 2007 Directive proposal on environmental crimes was negotiated by the Council of Ministers11 
and European Parliament12 following the co-decision procedure.13  Subsequently, the Draft Report of 
HartmutNassauer 14  was approved by the members of the European Parliament Legal Affairs 
Committee in a close vote15 on 8 April 2008. The Council and the European Parliament (following the 
first-reading Plenary session) reached an agreement on the final compromise text of the Directive on 
21 May 200816 and the Directive was finally adopted with minor amendments by the unanimous vote 
of the member states represented in the Council on 24 October 2008.17  The environmental crime 
directive requires the member states to criminalise serious environmental offences connected to 
violations of EC/EU environmental law and contain a general requirement that member states must 
prescribe ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ criminal penalties. The Commission thereby hoped 
that harmonisation of environmental criminal law would help improve the implementation deficit of 
EC environmental legislation and provide a strong deterrent against transboundary environmental 
crimes within the EU.18 
 Since the EU member states are already bound by the EU environmental crime directive 
establishing environmental criminal liability standards, an eventual ratification of the convention by 
those member states arguably would have limited legal or practical significance. Even though the text 
of the EU environmental crime directive was influenced by the Council of Europe convention, as will 
be discussed below, there are considerable differences between the two instruments.  Yet one of the 
advantages of a Council of Europe instrument on environmental crimes over a European Union 
instrument is that the former could potentially bind a larger number of states than a European Union 
measure.19 
                                                
9 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of the Environment 
through Criminal Law, COM (2007) 51 final, 9 February 2007.  
10 Formally withdrawn in the Official Journal2008/C 68/02 on 13 March 2008. 
11 See for example Working Party on Substantive Criminal Law, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law5152/08 DROIPEN 1ENV 12 CODEC 17 11 
January 2008, available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/ 
12 Draft Report on the Directive on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law. European Parliament, 
Committee on Legal Affairs, Rapporteur: HartmutNassauer, 26 February 2008. 
13 The co-decision procedure is set out under Article 294 TFEU (former Article 251 EC). 
14 See Report on proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the 
environment through criminal law, A6-0154/2008 of 15 April 2008 [COM(2007)0051 – C6-0063/2007 – 2007/0022(COD)] 
European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs, Rapporteur: HartmutNassauer. 
15 15 Committee members voted in favour while 11 voted against the proposal. There were two abstentions. See 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/environment/meps-vote-outlaw-green-crimes/article-171498 (accessed 10 February 2015). 
16 See Position of the European Parliament Adopted at First Reading on 21 May 2008 with a View to the Adoption of 
the Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of the Environment through 
Criminal Law, available at www.europarl.europa.eu (accessed 10 February 2015).    
17 Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on the protection of the 
environment through criminal law, Official Journal L 328, 6 December 2008, p. 28-37. 
18 See forth Recital to the Explanatory Memorandum to the 2007 environmental crime directive proposal. 
19 Presently, the Council of Europe has 47 member states, while the EU has, following the two most recent EU 
enlargements in 2007 and 2013, 28 Member States.  However, it is not necessarily true that the CoE convention would ensure 
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 It is apparent that there will be insufficient political will by the European governments to boost 
the ratification process of the Council of Europe environmental crime convention. This is particularly 
so because the EU member states are themselves already bound by the EU standards under the 
environmental criminal law directive.  So unless the political will across Europe increases for adoption 
of more effective measures to improve interstate cooperation against environmental crime, it is likely 
that the CoE environmental crime convention will face a similar fate to the Lugano Convention on 
civil liability for environmental damage,20 which has not at time of writing attracted one single 
ratification by the Council of Europe member states, even after more than fifteen years since its 
adoption.21 
 On the other hand, the adoption of a Council of Europe and EU instruments on environmental 
criminal law could be regarded as complementary. This would appear to be confirmed by the fact that 
the Council of Europe has adopted other conventions in the area of criminal law and procedure 
(including, for example, on cybercrime, corruption and human trafficking) which overlap with the 
content of EU criminal-law cooperation instruments on those same subjects. It is notable that those 
conventions are widely ratified. Therefore, those Council of Europe conventions could be regarded as 
complementary to existing EU criminal-law initiatives.22 
 This suggests that the regionalisation of environmental criminal liability standards in Europe may 
be confined to the EU Member States for some time.23 On the other hand, it might be necessary to 
control and prevent cross-boundary environmental crime affecting the Council of Europe member 
states, including cross-border environmental damage involving non-EU states. 24  This includes 
cooperation with third-country (non-EU) Council of Europe member states (for example Russia, 
Ukraine or Turkey). Those could have considerable real and potential cross-border environmental 
impacts in neighbouring EU member states. Importantly, the most serious nuclear power plant 
accident in Europe to date (Chernobyl in 1986) happened in Ukraine (not a EU member state, but 
currently a Council of Europe member state). This accident had considerable cross-border health and 
environmental impacts not only on neighbouring states in the former Soviet Union, but also on 
                                                                                                                                                            
a wider participation than the EU environmental crime directive, as the convention only requires three ratifications for it to 
enter into force.   
20 The Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability for Damage resulting from Activities Dangerous to the 
Environment CETS No.: 150 (‘the Lugano Convention’) 
21 A minimum of three ratifications is required for the convention to enter into force. Similarly, in this case the EU 
member states are already bound by the EU civil liability directive adopted in 2004. See Directive 2004/35 on Environmental 
Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage [2004] OJ L 143/56.   
22 Compare, for example, the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption CETS No.: 173 and the EU 
Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on Combating Corruption in the Private Sector, OJ L328 (2003), 
at 54; OJC195/2 (1997); OJ L279/1 (1997); OJ L358/2 (1998); the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime CETS no. 185 
and the EU Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA of 24 February 2005 on Attacks Against Information Systems, OJ 
L69 (2005), at 67; and Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, Warsaw, 3 May 2005 
(CETS No. 197) and Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA of 19 July 2002 on Combating Trafficking in Human 
Beings, OJ L2003 (2002), at 2). 
23 See R. Pereira, Environmental Criminal Liability and Enforcement in European and International Law (Brill, Leiden, 
2015) 
24 Ibid.
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countries in Eastern and Northern Europe.25 Other examples of possible transboundary environmental 
impacts arising from a Council of Europe (non-EU) member state to EU member states include 
transboundary pollution from oil and gas activities carried out by Russia in the Arctic sea; or a cross-
boundary gas pipeline running from Russia to Turkey via the Black Sea controlled by Turkey, such as 
the proposed Turkey Stream project (Turkey is currently a candidate country, but not a EU member 
state). Other examples of cross-border environmental impacts arise in the context of illegal fishing 
and wildlife crime. In this vein, the 2000 International Crime Assessment report released by the US 
government suggested that Russian crime syndicates are believed to earn as much as $4 billion 
annually from the illegal export of some 2 million metric tons of seafood, including to the European 
market.26 
 Despite these possible environmental impacts of cross-boundary activities between Council of 
Europe (non-EU) member states and EU member states, it should also be noted that as part of the 
enlargement process, candidate countries to EU membership —which includes for example Serbia and 
Turkey— are required to implement the environmental crime directive in order to comply with the 
EU’s acquis communaitaire.27 This suggests that the process of enlargement could lead to broader 
regionalisation of environmental criminal law standards in Europe beyond the EU member states, 
even if the situation remains that there is lack of political will by the Council of Europe member 
states to ratify the environmental crime convention. It should also be noted that the Council of 
Europe convention is also open for accession by “non-member States which have participated in its 
elaboration”28 as well as by other third countries provided that a number of procedural requirements 
are followed.29 
 Obviously the entering into force of the Council of Europe Convention is not dependant on the 
ratifications of the EU member states, since it could still enter into force with a minimum of three 
ratifications including non-EU, Council of Europe member states. Yet this scenario would not be 
without legal implications for the EU as at least one EU member state (ie. Estonia, the only state to 
have ratified the environmental crime convention so far) would be bound by both the EU and 
Council of Europe environmental crime instruments.  
                                                
25 Marc Lallanilla,Chernobyl: Facts About the Nuclear Disaster, September 25, 2013, http://www.livescience.com/39961-
chernobyl.html (accessed 15 February 2015). 
26 ‘According to press reports citing Russian law enforcement estimates’ Seethe 2000 International Crime Assessment 
report. Russia ratified the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) in 13/01/1992. See generally, Sally Stoecker 
and Ramziya Shakirova, Environmental crime and corruption in Russia: federal and regional perspectives (Routledge, London, 
2014).  
27 European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations: Conditions for Membership, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm (accessed 15 February 2015). 
28 Art. 13 (1) Council of Europe environmental crime convention. This provision only applies to Canada, which has 
participated in the drafting of the convention. However, at the time of writing Canada has not yet signed or ratified the 
convention.  
29 Art. 14 of the convention states that “[a]fter the entry into force of this Convention, the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe, after consulting the Contracting States to the Convention, may invite any State not a member of the 
Council of Europe to accede to this Convention (…). This article subjects the accession by a non-Council of Europe member 
state to the condition that there is ‘a decision taken by the majority provided for in Article 20.d of the Statute of the Council 
of Europe and by the unanimous vote of the representatives of the Contracting States entitled to sit on the Committee.” 
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 The next section examines the extent to which the adoption of the environmental crime directive 
could have implications for the external competence of the EU member states to negotiate and adopt 
the CoE environmental crime convention. In particular, it discusses the extent to which the adoption 
of the EU environmental crime directive in 2008 could hinder the ability of the EU member states to 
ratify independently the Council of Europe environmental crime convention. 
THE EU EXTERNAL COMPETENCE TO NEGOTIATE AND ADOPT INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS   
The adoption of the EU directive on environmental crimes will have important consequences for the 
member states’ external competence to negotiate and eventually ratify the Council of Europe 
environmental crime convention. This might require the involvement of both the Union and the 
member states in the negotiations of the Council of Europe environmental crime convention.30 
However, it should be noted that the EC has not participated in the negotiations of the 
environmental crime convention, which only foresees the accession by states, but not regional 
organisations such as the EC/EU.31 
 According to Article 3 (2) TFEU, the Union has exclusive competence for the conclusion of an 
international agreement ‘insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules and their scope.’ So in case 
the EU exercises its internal competence (for example, through the adoption of the environmental 
crime directive), this could lead to the exclusivity of the EU external competence. This manner of 
acquiring exclusive external competences was recognized for the first time by the ECJ in the ERTA 
case32 and was further refined, inter alia, in the Open Skies cases.33 Yet for the EU competence to be 
exclusive following the EU legislative action, the conclusion of an international agreement would have 
to ‘affect common rules or alter their scope.’ In order to establish that the conclusion of an 
international agreement affects common rules or alter their scope, the EU institutions might have to 
‘specify in detail the aspects of Community legislation which could be prejudiced by the agreement.’34 
 The EU exclusive competence would arise in general when the EU internal legislation involves 
total harmonization of standards. Minimum harmonization measures, such as the EU environmental 
                                                
30 See House of Lords, European Union Committee, 42nd Report of Session 2005-2006 ‘The Criminal Law Competence 
of the European Community. Report with Evidence’ 28 July 2006infra at 45: “Another consequence of moving policing and 
criminal law into the First Pillar is that if the Community were to act internally (for example, by adopting a Directive on a 
particular subject) then the Member States wouldlose competence, in favour of the Community, to conclude treaties or other 
agreements with third States on that subject. Even if the Community rules are only a partial harmonisation, Member States’ 
freedom would berestricted. They would share competence with the Community.” Consequently, as Professor Peers pointed 
out, “almost any future negotiations, certainly at a multilateral level within the Council of Europe, for instance, on 
international criminal treaties, would involve both the Community and the Member States” (Q 110)’ (para. 158). 
31 See Article 13 (1) and Article 14 of the Council of Europe environmental crime convention. See also, Pereira (n 23)  
32 Case 22-70, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Communities. Judgment of the 
Court of 31 March 1971 
33 Open Skyies case (Case C-466-98 Commission v. UK (2002) ECR I-9427. See further, G. de Baere, ‘EU External 
Action’, in C. Barnard and S. Peers (eds.) European Union Law (OUP, Oxford, 2014) at 715. 
34 Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Open Skyies case (Case C-466-98 Commission v. UK (2002) ECR I-9427; 
See also, e.g. Case C-467/98 Commission v Denmark ECR I-9519)  
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crime directive adopted pursuant to Articles 192 and 193 TFEU, would normally give rise to non-
exclusive EU competences.35 As the ECJ held in Opinion 1/03, the fact that both the Union rules and 
international agreement in question lay down minimum standards: ‘may justify the conclusion that 
the [Union] rules are not affected, even if the [Union] rules and the provisions of the agreement cover 
the same area.’36 This suggests that, in principle, the EU member states would then remain free to 
negotiate and ratify the Council of Europe environmental crime convention. However, it should be 
noted that the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4 (3) TEU could still restrict member states’ 
external actions. This would apply even if the member states were to be acting within their own 
sphere of competence.37 
 Another problem is that the Council of Europe environmental crime convention does not contain 
a ‘disconnection clause’ to protect the future status of Community/Union law, which have become 
common in the Council of Europe Conventions adopted since 1989.38  One example is the Council of 
Europe convention on civil liability for environmental damage, which states that ‘in their mutual 
relations, Parties which are members of the European Economic Community shall apply Community 
rules and shall therefore not apply the rules arising from this Convention except in so far as there is 
no Community rule governing the particular subject concerned.’39 According to the Explanatory 
report to that convention, the purpose of this ‘disconnection clause’ is twofold:40 firstly, it aims at 
permitting the EC member states, when a Convention contains subjects for which the Community 
has exercised its competence, to sign and ratify the Convention together with the Community 
without the need to make declarations about the division of their competence. The second purpose of 
the ‘disconnection clause’ is to ensure that the ‘EEC Member States and the Community would not 
have to abstain from becoming a Party to the Convention in the case of possible minor discrepancies 
between the provisions of the Convention and Community rules during the period needed to bring 
these rules in conformity with the provisions of the Convention.41 Yet it has been argued that ‘a 
disconnection clause’ to protect the status and future development of Community/Union law in the 
text of the [Council of Europe] Convention is not strictly necessary. This is because “the same legal 
result can be deduced from the mixed ratification of the Convention and may be confirmed through a 
declaratory statement to that effect.”42 
 The above analysis suggests that the EU member states remain competent to negotiate and ratify 
the Council of Europe environmental crime convention so long as it does not ‘affect common rules or 
alter their scope.’ The next section discusses the similarities and potential incompatibilities between 
                                                
35 G. de Baere, supra (n 33). 
36 Opinion 1/03, Opinion pursuant to Article 300(6) EC (‘Competence of the Community to conclude the new Lugano 
Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters’). 
37 de Baere, supra n. 33, at 721-722. 
38 F. Hoffmeister, ‘The Contribution of EU Practice to International Law’ in M. Cremona (ed.), Developments in EU 
External Relations Law (OUP, Oxford, 2008).  
39 The Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability for Damage resulting from Activities Dangerous to the 
Environment CETS No.: 150 (‘the Lugano Convention’), Article 25. 
40 Explanatory report to the Lugano Convention, Article 25, 88. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Hoffmeister, supran. 38, at 69. 
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the two instruments, which could have the effect of hindering the ability of the EU member states to 
negotiate and accede independently to the Council of Europe environmental crime convention.  
THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME CONVENTION 
WITH THE EU ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME DIRECTIVE 
It is not so clear the extent to which the provisions of the Council of Europe environmental crime 
convention affect the EU common rules or alter their scope, particularly as the EU and Council of 
Europe instruments only impose minimum standards, allowing state parties to enhance those 
standards. As will be discussed in this section, there are considerable differences between the Council 
of Europe environmental crime convention and the EU environmental crime directive. The 
differences between the two instruments examined in this section relate to the structure and 
definition of some criminal offences (including inchoate offences); complicity; criminal penalties and 
corporate criminal liability rules. 
(1)  General Structure of Criminal offences 
As regards the general structure of the criminal offences, there is only one autonomous offence in the 
Council of Europe Convention on environmental criminal law. This offence requires state parties to 
introduce criminal sanctions irrespectively of whether the underlying conduct is illicit (‘unlawful’) or 
not within their legal systems. The autonomous offence relates to the intentional ‘discharge, emission 
or introduction of a quantity of substances or ionising radiation into air, soil or water [which either] 
causes death or serious injury to any person, or creates a significant risk of causing death or risk of 
serious injury to any person.’43 This offence must be criminalised regardless of its unlawfulness under 
national law, i.e. the infringement of the law, an administrative regulation or a decision taken by a 
competent authority.44 The objective of this provision is not to leave it to the discretion of the 
national regulatory bodies the prerogative to grant licences which may risk the life or physical health 
of humans. Unlike the Council of Europe Convention, the EU environmental crime directive does 
not contain any autonomous offence. Under the directive, the ‘unlawfulness’ of the activity is a 
requirement for all offences.45 Therefore, a licence granted to an operator may constitute a defence to 
all criminal offences under the Directive. 
 Another difference between the two instruments relate to the definition of abstract endangerment 
offences. Criminal offences are categorised as ‘abstract endangerment’ if they do not require a specific 
result, for example, harm to the environment or human health. The Council of Europe Convention on 
environmental crime envisages abstract endangerment offences in Article 4, paragraphs a) to e), given 
that those offences do not require a specific result or environmental damage. This includes the 
‘unlawful operation of a plant’ and the ‘unlawful causing of noise’. Since abstract endangerment 
                                                
43 Article 2 (1) (a) of the Council of Europe Convention on environmental crime.Convention on the Protection of the 
Environment through Criminal Law, Council of Europe, ETS No. 172. 
44 See the definition of ‘unlawful’ under Article 1 (a) of the Council of Europe Convention.   
45 See Article 3 of the environmental crime directive.   
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criminal offences are not common to all legal systems, the drafters of the Convention left it to the 
discretion of the State Parties to establish whether such offences are of a criminal or administrative 
nature.46 In contrast, there are only two abstract endangerment offences in the EU environmental 
crime directive. The illegal shipment of waste contrary to Regulation (EC) No. 1013/2006 on 
shipments of waste,47 which includes the shipment carried out without the notification or consent of 
the competent authorities;48 and the ‘production, importation, exportation, placing on market or use 
of ozone-depleting substances.’49 All the other offences require at least a concrete endangerment to the 
environment or human health.50 
 By requiring the criminalisation of an autonomous offence, the Council of Europe environmental 
crime convention imposes a higher standard than the environmental crime directive. Therefore, if a 
EU member state were to be bound by both instruments, it would have to implement the highest 
standard and introduce the autonomous offence defined in the Council of Europe convention. In 
contrast, the convention and the directive list different types of abstract endangerment offences (the 
unlawful operation of a plant; illegal waste shipment, etc), which means that a EU member state 
would have to comply with the harmonisation requirements of both instruments, which hence could 
be regarded as complementary. 
(2) Inchoate Offences and Complicity 
Another area in which the Council of Europe and EU environmental crime instruments differ relate 
the definition of inchoate offences. The criminalisation of inchoate offences is foreseen in Article 4 of 
the EU environmental crime directive, which states that ‘Member States shall ensure that inciting, 
aiding and abetting the intentional conduct referred in Article 3 is punishable as a criminal offence.’ 
In contrast, the Council of Europe on environmental criminal law only requires the criminalisation of 
inchoate offences as regards one of the ‘intentional’ offences under Article 2 (1) of that convention.51 
 Despite the fact that no specific provision on liability for omissions is present in the Council of 
Europe environmental crime convention, the Explanatory Memorandum explains that the offences 
under the convention may be committed by acts or omissions, at least in the context of the 
                                                
46 Dandachi S. A., ‘Convention sur la Protection de L’Environnement’, 2 Revue Juridique de L’Environnement(2003), at 
284. 
47 Regulation (EC) No. 1013/2006, OJ L 190, 12.7.2006. 
48 Article 3 (c) of the environmental crime directive refers to Article 2 (35) of the Regulation on shipments of waste. 
This later provision defines illegal shipment as those shipments carried out under certain circumstances including a) without 
notification to all competent authorities concerned pursuant to this Regulation; or (b) without the consent of the competent 
authorities concerned pursuant to this Regulation. 
49 Article 3 (h) of the environmental crime directive. See also Pereira (n 23) 
50 The offences in environmental crime directive generally require the prohibited activity “to cause” or “[to be] likely to 
cause” damage or injury to a person or the environment. See Article 3 (a), (b), (d), (e). The offences against protected 
specimens (f-g) and protected habitat (h) also apply a specific damage threshold. 
51 Art. 2 (2) of the Council of Europe convention states that Each Party shall adopt such appropriate measures as may 
be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law aiding or abetting the commission of any of the offences 
established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article. 
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‘intentional offences’ falling under Article 2 of the convention. 52  In contrast, Recital 6 of the 
environmental crime directive clarifies that the offences under the directive may be committed by 
omissions, in particular the ‘[f]ailure to comply with a legal duty to act can have the same effect as 
active behaviour and should therefore also be subject to corresponding penalties.’ 
 The Council of Europe environmental crime convention contains an obligation for states to 
criminalise complicity in relation to the intentional offences listed in Article 2 (1) only.53 So it is not 
necessary for state parties to criminalise complicity in the case of the offences listed in Article 4 
(which may be of a criminal or administrative nature) nor in relation to the negligent offences under 
Article 3. Similarly, in the course of the decision-making leading to the adoption the EU 
environmental crime directive, the European Parliament rejected the original proposal for the 
criminalisation of complicity in the case of non-intentional offences.54 This is in light of the fact that 
in some Member States non-intentional (secondary) participation in a criminal offence is not 
punishable.55 Hence Article 4 of the environmental crime directive states that “Member States shall 
ensure that (…) aiding and abetting the intentional conduct referred to in Article 3 is punishable as a 
criminal offence” (emphasis added).56 
 
In general it could be said that that the environmentalcrime directive adopts higher standards in 
relation to inchoate offences than the Council of Europe convention. Yet it is notable that the 
directive and Council of Europe convention adopt similar standards as regards the definition 
ofcomplicity to commit an environmental offence. 
(3) Mens Rea and the Degree of Harm 
Under the Council of Europe environmental crime convention, offences are differentiated on the 
basis of the mensrearequirement. For example, while ‘intentional’ unlawful transport and disposal of 
hazardous waste endangering human and animal life fall under article 2 (1) (c) of the convention - for 
which signatory parties must introduce criminal sanctions - the “unlawful disposal, treatment, storage, 
transport, export or import of waste” (so non-hazardous wastes or other wastes that are not likely to 
endanger human and animal life) fall under Article 4 (c) when committed “intentionally or with 
negligence.”57 This means the convention leaves it to the discretion of national Parliaments the choice 
                                                
52 Commentary III, Section II, of the explanatory memorandum states that Article 2 covers the most serious 
environmental offences which, whether by an act or an omission, are committed "intentionally". 
53 See Article 2 (2) of the 1998 Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law, 172: ‘Each 
Party shall adopt such appropriate measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law 
aiding or abetting the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.’ 
54 See Report on proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the 
environment through criminal law, A6-0154/2008 of 15 April 2008 (COM(2007)0051 – C6-0063/2007 – 2007/0022(COD)) 
European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs, Rapporteur: HartmutNassauer, at 17. 
55 For example in English criminal law the mensrea for secondary participation (aiding, abetting, counselling or 
procuring) is intention. See A.P. Simester and G.R. Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (Hart, Oxford, 2007) at 
207. 
56 Pereira, supra (n 23)   
57 Ibid. 
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to adopt criminal or non-criminal sanctions. So the Contracting States to the convention are obliged, 
in relation to the "hard core" intentional offences under Articles 2, to classify them as "criminal."58 
Moreover, paragraph (1) of Article 3 extends criminal liability to negligent offences. Yet paragraph 2 of 
Article 3 allows contracting parties, when ratifying the Convention, to limit liability for Article 2 
offences to those committed with ‘gross negligence.’ 59 Under the EU environmental crime directive, 
member states are required to criminalise a number of prohibited activities committed intentionally 
or with ‘at least’ serious negligence.60 However, unlike the Council of Europe convention, the EU 
directive itself does not establish an aggravated liability depending on whether criminal offences are 
committed with intention, recklessness or negligence. This means that, to the extent that the Council 
of Europe convention aggravates the liability (in relation to ‘intentional’ offences), this would be the 
highest standard to be adopted by a EU member state bound by both environmental crime 
instruments. In contrast, the EU directive applies, in general, more stringent requirements in relation 
to offences committed with recklessness or serious negligence, and thus this would be the standard to 
be implemented. 
 Moreover, the approach under the Council of Europe Convention on environmental crime is to 
establish the need for criminalisation relative to the degree of harm or potential harm. The 
Contracting States to the convention are required to criminalize the “hard core” intentional offences 
under Article 2, all of which specify a specific degree of harm such as ‘death or serious injury to any 
person or substantial damage to the quality of air, soil, water, animals or plants.’ In a similar vein, 
most offences in the environmental crime directive require a specific result, i.e. that they cause or are 
likely to cause harm to persons or the environment (air, soil, water, animals or plants). The EU 
environmental crime directive also contains vague notions of harm such as ‘substantial damage,’ 
‘serious injury,’ ‘significant deterioration’ and ‘negligible impact’ in its definitions of offences.61  Yet 
as the directive only imposes minimum standards, member states may adopt higher standards and 
criminalise even less serious activities which do not cause or are likely to cause ‘substantial damage,’ 
‘serious injury’ or ‘significant deterioration.’62 It is clear that in both the Council of Europe and EU 
instruments on environmental criminal law, the seriousness of the violation of environmental law is 
paramount to establish a benchmark for criminalisation. In fact, ‘seriousness’ is a condition for the 
establishment of the EU competence to lay down environmental offences.63 This is reflected in the 
final text of the adopted 2008 directive, as all offences under the directive are linked to a threshold of 
serious harm, either actual or potential. As both the convention and the directive use similar 
terminology to define the seriousness of harm (e.g. ‘serious injury’, ‘significant deterioration’) linked 
                                                
58 Those offences should usually carry at least as an alternative sanction the sanction of imprisonment. See Article 6, 
2nd sentence of the convention.  
59 The Council of Europe convention refers to ‘gross negligence’, rather than ‘serious negligence’ applied in the EU 
environmental crime instruments. 
60 See ‘caput’ of Article 3 of the environmental crime directive. 
61 See Article 3(a)-(h) of the environmental crime directive. 
62  See Pereira, supra n 23. 
63 See Environmental Crimes (supra n. 8), paras. 47-48.   
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to specific offences, there appears to be no conflict between the two instruments as regards the 
definition of the threshold of harm required for establishing a criminal offence. 
(4) The range of criminal offences 
The range of offences in the Council of Europe Convention on environmental crime is more 
comprehensive than under the environmental crime directive. In particular, the Council of Europe 
convention protects additional forms of environmental media, such as offering legal protection in 
relation to the unlawful causing of ‘noise,’64 specific legal protection to ‘national parks, national 
reserve, water conservation or other protected areas,’65 as well as to ‘protected monuments’ and ‘other 
protected objects [and] property.’66 Hence, unlike the EU environmental crime directive which aims 
to protect ‘any person’ and ‘air’, ‘soil’, ‘water’, ‘animals’ or ‘plants,’ 67  the Council of Europe 
Convention additionally aims at protecting ‘property’ and other elements of the ‘built environment’, 
thus establishing a higher standard than the EU environmental crime directive.    
 Another difference relates to the definition of specific criminal offences. For example, the pollution-
control offences in the environmental crime directive borrow a number of elements from the pollution-
control offences under the Council of Europe convention on environmental crime. However, the Council 
of Europe convention requires the criminalisation only of concrete endangerment pollution-control 
offences (i.e. those that cause or are likely to cause damage) when committed intentionally or 
negligently,68 but not generally in relation to abstract endangerment pollution-control offences (such as 
the ‘unlawful operation of a plant’), which hence may be regarded as criminal or administrative offences 
by state parties.69 In another example, the Council of Europe Convention does not address directly the 
trade in ozone depleting substances, although the offence on illegal trade in chemicals could cover 
illegal trade in ozone depleting substances.70  In contrast, the EU environmental crime directive 
requires the criminalisation of ‘the production, importation, exportation, placing on the market or use’ 
of ozone depleting substances.71 Therefore, in so far as the EU environmental crime directive requires 
the criminalisation of pollution-control (non-intentional) offences, or in relation to illegal trade in 
ozone depleting substances, it could be said that the directive imposes higher standards than those 
foreseen in the Council of Europe convention. 
 Aside from the level of harm (as discussed above), it is not always clear why the Council of Europe 
environmental crime convention “downgrades” certain offences to Article 4 (in relation to which there 
is no obligation for contracting States to penalise), particularly in the context of wildlife crime. This 
is a considerable weakness of the Convention, as some potentially very serious environmental offences 
with transboundary impacts, in particular the “unlawful trade, possession, damaging (…) of protected 
                                                
64 Article 4 (b) of the CoE environmental crime convention. 
65 Article 4 (f), ibid. 
66 Article 2 (1) (b), ibid. 
67 See Article 3 of the environmental crime directive.  
68 See Articles 2 and 3 of the CoE environmental crime convention. 
69 Article 4, d) ibid. 
70 See Article 4, e) ibid. 
71 Article 3(i) of the environmental crime directive. 
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wild flora and fauna species,”72 only fall under Article 4 and thus there is no obligation on state parties 
to criminalise such offences. In this regard, it appears that the convention incorporates an 
‘anthropocentric’ approach to environmental protection. Indeed, under the convention ‘wildlife’ and 
‘natural habitat protection’ crimes (ie “possession (…) or trading of or in protected (…) species” or 
“changes detrimental to natural components of a national park, natural reserve (…) and other 
protected areas”), even when committed intentionally, would not necessarily entail criminal 
sanctions.73  In contrast, the environmental crime directive requires the criminalisation of both the 
illegal trade in endangered species and destruction of natural habitats, and thus adopts a higher 
standard of environmental protection in the context of wildlife crime.74 
(5) Criminal liability of corporate entities 
A cautious approach to the application of criminal penalties to corporate entities is found in the 
Council of Europe environmental crime convention. Article 9 (3) of the convention allows any state 
upon ratification to declare that it reserves the right not to apply the provision under the convention 
[i.e. Article 9] which establishes the liability of legal persons.75 This provision allows signatory parties 
to enter a reservation in case they do not wish to introduce criminal sanctions to corporations. At the 
time of writing, Italy is the only signatory state to have entered a reservation under that Article 9 (3) 
of the convention. Similarly, the environmental crime directive does not require member states to 
impose criminal sanctions on corporations, thus member states may introduce sanctions of a non-
criminal nature to corporate entities. However, the directive goes further to require member states to 
ensure that the liability of the corporation (which may be of a criminal or civil nature) is linked to the 
acts of individuals with either: a) the power of representation of the legal person; b) an authority to 
take decisions on behalf of the legal person; c) or an authority to exercise control.76 Although neither 
the directive nor the Council of Europe instrument require member states to necessarily introduce 
penalties of a criminal nature to corporations, the EU directive contains more detailed rules 
establishing the conditions for the liability of corporate entities, and thus adopts a higher standard as 
regards corporate liability than the Council of Europe convention.  
(6) Criminal penalties 
As regards the application of criminal penalties, there are important differences between the Council 
of Europe convention and the EU environmental crime directive. The Council of Europe 
environmental crime convention does not require Contracting Parties to harmonise the types and 
levels of criminal penalties (e.g. imprisonment, fines, restoration of the environment) for particular 
                                                
72 Article 4 (g) of the Council of Europe environmental crime convention. 
73 The ‘anthropocentric’ approach of the convention is further evidenced if one comparesthewidldife offences under 
Article 4 (f) and (g) with the ‘intentional’ offences under Article 2 of the convention, all of which recognise the protection of 
‘any person’ in addition to the protection of elements of the natural environment and/or property.  See also, Pereira (n 29) 
74 See Article 3 (f) and (g) of the environmental crime directive. 
75 Article 9 (3) of the Environmental crime convention. 
76 Article 6 of the environmental crime directive. 
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crimes, only containing a general provisions on sanctions. In particular, Article 6 of the convention 
states that ‘the sanctions available shall include imprisonment and pecuniary sanctions and may include 
reinstatement of the environment’ (emphasis added). Moreover, Article 7 of the convention addresses 
the confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of the environmental crime. In contrast, the 2008 
environmental crime directive does not prescribe specific types and levels of criminal penalties.77The 
directive only contains a general requirement that Member States introduce ‘effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive’ criminal penalties. Although the provisions on criminal penalties are deficient in both 
the environmental crime directive and Council of Europe convention, the latter adopts a higher 
standard by requiring the introduction of specific types of criminal penalties. 
THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE EU ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES WITH 
MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
Aside from the compatibility of the EU and Council of Europe environmental crime instruments, the 
compatibility of the EU environmental crime directive(s) with international environmental 
agreements in general is a crucial one to consider.  Stephen C. McCaffrey 78  identified ‘penal 
provisions’ in some fifteen multilateral agreements relating to the environment,79 as well as several 
bilateral agreements between states.80Most commonly, these instruments require the contracting 
parties to take ‘appropriate measures to ensure the application of the provisions of the agreement [in 
question] and the punishment of infractions against [those] provisions.’81 Other approaches include 
requiring state parties to ‘enact and enforce such legislation as may be necessary to make effective the 
(…) provisions (of the agreement) with appropriate penalties for violations thereof.’82For example, in 
the context of the transboundary movement of hazardous waste, both the Basel83 and Bamako84 
                                                
77 This limitation is in light of the Ship-Source Pollution ruling (Case 440/05) in which the ECJ held that the 
Community did not have the power to define specific types and levels of criminal penalties. However, it is possible that the 
EU environmental crime directive will be amended inter alia to require that member states adopt specific types and levels of 
criminal penalties based on the post-Lisbon legal basis established in Article 83 (2) TFEU. See further, Pereira, supra (n23). 
78 S. McCaffrey, ‘Crimes Against the Environment’ in C. Bassiouni (ed), International Criminal Law (Brill, Leiden, 
2008), at 989. 
79 See the references to some of these agreements below, including the Convention for the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1971, arts. 4 and 7, and CITES (Convention on the International Trade 
of Endangered Species), art. 8, par. 1 and the Convention for Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources, 1974, 
art. 12. 
80 For example, ‘Agreement between Chile, Ecuador and Peru on Regulations Governing Whaling in the Waters of the 
South Pacific.’ (1954) See McCaffrey, supra n. 76, at 990. 
81 See e.g. International Convention for Regulation of Whaling (1946) art.  9; The Convention for Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (1972) art.15 (3); Convention on Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (1972) arts.4 and 7; The Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from 
Land-Based Sources (1978) (replaced by the OSPAR Convention) art.12; Convention on the International Trade of 
Endangered Species, art 8, par. 1.See also, McCaffrey, supra n. 76, at 1019. 
82 Ibid. 
83 See Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, 1673 UNTS 126 (adopted 22 March 
1989, in force 5 May 1992). Article 9, par. 5, reads: “Each Party shall introduce appropriate national/domestic legislation to 
prevent and punish illegal traffic.  The Parties shall co-operate with a view to achieving the objects of this Article” (emphasis 
added)  
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Conventions on the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes contain provisions requiring the 
use of penal measures, that is, a requirement that states take ‘appropriate measures’ to ensure the 
application of the agreement and punishment of violators thereof.85  Other examples of international 
environmental treaties which contain an obligation on States to implement penal measures include the 
Washington Convention on Illegal Trade in Endangered Species (‘CITES’) which requires parties to 
‘penalise trade in, or possession of, such specimens, or both.’ 86  Under the convention on the 
prevention of marine pollution from ships (‘MARPOL’),87 the penalties specified under the law of the 
parties for anti-pollution standards shall be ‘adequate in severity to discourage violations’ and ‘shall be 
equally severe irrespective of where the violations occur’. 88  Although MARPOL falls short of 
requiring that the penalties to implement the convention are of a criminal character, in practice many 
States have implemented the MARPOL enforcement provisions by means of criminal offences and 
penalties.89 
 Although the compatibility of the EU environmental crime directive with multilateral 
environmental agreements has not yet been tested by the Court of Justice of the EU, in Case C-
308/06 (Intertanko and others) (hereinafter ‘Intertanko’)90 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had an 
opportunity to rule on the question of the compatibility of the 2005 Directive on ship-source 
pollution91 with international law. Although this directive itself did not prescribe criminal sanctions 
for shipping pollution offences, it defined shipping pollution ‘infringements’ which were linked to a 
complementary EU Framework Decision which itself required the criminalisation of ship-source 
pollution.92 In its ruling handed down on 3 June 2008, the ECJ held, similar to its decision in Peralta,93 
                                                                                                                                                            
84 1991 Bamako Convention1on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of the Transboundary Movement 
and Management of Hazardous wastes within Africa, (adopted 30 January 1991, entered into force 22 April 1998), reprinted in 
African Yearbook of International Law 269.. Article 9 reads “Each Party shall introduce appropriate national legislation for 
imposing criminal penalties on all persons who have planned, carried out, or assisted in such illegal imports. Such penalties 
shall be sufficiently high to both punish and deter such conduct.” (emphasis added).   
85 See further, Pereira, supra n. 23. 
86 Seeart 8, par. 1 of the Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Species, 27 UST 1087 (adopted 3 March 
1973, 1 July 1975) 
87 Convention on Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships 1973/1978, 1340 UNTS 184 (MARPOL) (adopted 2 
November 1973, entry into force 2 October 1983). 
88 Article 4 (4) ibid.   
89 See I. Bantekas, International Criminal Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010). This includes the EU Member States 
with the adoption of the directive on ship-source pollution, as amended in 2009 to require the EU Member States to 
introduce criminal offence and penalties. See Directive 2005/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Ship-
Source Pollution and on the Introduction of Penalties for Infringements, 7 September 2005, OfficialJournal L 255/11; 
30.9.2005 and Directive 2009/123/EC of theEuropeanParliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 amendingDirective 
2005/35/EC onship-sourcepollution and ontheintroduction of penaltiesforinfringements; OfficialJournal, L 280/52.  
27.10.2009. In the UK context, seeSection 131 of the UK’s Merchant Shipping Act 1995  Reg. 12. 13 amd 36 of the Prevention 
of Oil Pollution Regulations U.S. Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS) 33 USC. See also, Pereira, supra n23. 
90 Case C-308/06 The Queen on the Application of: International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko), 
International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (Intercargo), Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, Lloyd’s Register, 
International Salvage Union v Secretary of State for Transport, 3 June 2008. 
91 Directive 2005/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Ship-Source Pollution and on the 
Introduction of Penalties for Infringements, 2003/0037 (COD). 
92 Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA to Strengthen the Criminal-Law Framework for the Enforcement of the 
Law against Ship-Source Pollution. This decision-making mechanism was known (prior to the ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty) as the ‘double-text mechanism.’ 
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that the Community itself was not bound directly by the IMO International Convention for 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (‘MARPOL’),94 as the Community is not a signatory party to that 
Convention, despite the fact that all Member States are parties to it.95 Consequently, the ECJ could 
not review the legality of the shipping directive in light of MARPOL.96 As regards the legality of the 
Directive in light of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’)97 – to which the 
Community is a party - the ECJ held that the Community was bound by that Convention and that it 
formed an integral part of the Community legal order.98 Yet the court held that the nature and broad 
logic of UNCLOS precluded the examination of the validity of the shipping directive in light of its 
provisions, as UNCLOS was not directly applicable in the EU legal order99 as it does not aim to 
create rights for individuals or companies, such as shipping companies.100  On this basis, the ECJ 
ultimately declared that it was not possible for the court to examine the compatibility of directive on 
shipping pollution with either MARPOL or UNCLOS. 
 The court was correct to hold that a provision of an international agreement must be 
unconditional and sufficiently precise (and must confer rights on individuals), before it can be 
regarded to be directly effective in the Community/Union legal order. Yet the court failed to 
consider the exceptions to that rule recognized in previous case-law, namely in cases in which the 
Community/Union act aims at giving effect to an international agreement 101  or where the 
Community/Union act expressly refers to the international agreement.102  In particular, unlike is the 
case with MARPOL (to which the EC is not a party), the Union/Community is bound UNCLOS, 
so it is regrettable that the Court in Intertanko does not assess the references to that Convention in 
the shipping pollution directive103 in order to establish whether it was necessary to apply the test of 
direct effect of international agreements or not. In other words, the Court could have assessed the 
legality of the shipping pollution directive in light of UNCLOS given the references in the former to 
the latter, regardless of whether or not UNCLOS has direct effect and confers rights on individuals. 
However, it is important to note that there are no references to UNCLOS in the provisions of the 
shipping pollution directive which were contested in this legal action (namely Articles 4 and 5 (2)); 
                                                                                                                                                            
93 Case C-379/92 Peralta [1994] ECR I-3453, para. 16. 
94‘ MARPOL’ supra (n88) 
95 For further on this case, see R. Pereira, ‘On the Legality of the Ship-Source Pollution 2005/35/EC Directive: the 
Intertanko Case and Selected Others’, 17 European Energy & Environmental Law Review(2008)pp. 372-383. 
96 Intertanko, para. 50: “Since the Community is not bound by Marpol 73/78, the mere fact that Directive 2005/35 has 
the objective of incorporating certain rules set out in that Convention into Community law is likewise not sufficient for it 
to be incumbent upon the Court to review the directive’s legality in the light of the Convention.” 
97 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 3 (adopted 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 1994) 
(‘UNCLOS’) 
98 Intertanko, para. 53 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. See NV International Fruit Company and others v Commission of the European Communities, Joined cases 41 
to 44-70, 13 May 1971. See also, Pereira, supra n. 96. 
101 See Case C-69/89 Nakajima v Council [1991] ECR I-2069. 
102 Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission [1989] ECR 1781. See also Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I-4973). 
103 See Article 3 (1) (c), Article 7 (2) and Article 9 of the ship-source pollution directive. 
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and the main objective of the shipping pollution directive appears to be to implement MARPOL, 
rather than UNCLOS, standards. 104 
 The decision of the ECJ in Intertanko suggests that the court will be cautious to review the legality 
of EU secondary (environmental crime) legislation in light of multilateral environmental agreements, 
even in the case of international agreements to which the EC/EU are parties. The court’s restrictive 
approach suggests that only exceptionally will the court recognise direct effect to international 
agreements. This appears to bean attempt by the court to maintain the delicate balance between the 
the international and EU legal orders; and to preserve the EU’s position in negotiating and adopting 
such international agreements. Yet the disadvantage of court’s restrictive approach is that it 
considerably limits the access of individuals to an effective remedy before the national courts to 
challenge the legality of EU secondary legislation in light of international environmental agreements.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Although there are significant differences between the provisions of the Council of Europe 
convention and the EU environmental crime directive, it does not appear that the former ‘affects 
common rules’ or ‘alter their scope’ to a significant extent so as to make the two instruments 
incompatible. Indeed, both instruments share the common goal of providing a legal framework for 
interstate criminal-law cooperation to combat environmental crime and for harmonisation of national 
environmental law in Europe. So it is unlikely that the minimum standards adopted in each 
instrument could be regarded as incompatible. Whereas at times the Council of Europe adopts certain 
higher standards than the EU environmental crime directive (eg as regards the definition of criminal 
penalties), at other times the environmental crime directive imposes higher standards (eg by requiring 
the criminalisation of wildlife crime and trade in ozone-depleting substances). But the existence of 
these differences does not mean that those instruments are incompatible. If a EU Member State (eg 
Estonia) were to be bound by both the Council of Europe convention and the EU environmental 
crime directive, it would have to adopt as a minimum the highest standard recognized in either 
instrument. The survey carriedout in this paper of specific provisions of the directive and Council of 
Europe conventionon environmental crime does notsuggest that there are fundamental differences 
between the two instruments which could render them incompatible and thus affect or alter the scope 
of the common EU rules. 
 Therefore, it is suggested that the EU member states remain competent to negotiate and ratify 
independently the Council of Europe convention, despite the exercise of the EU’s internal legislative 
powers through the adoption of the environmental crime directive. This conforms with the principle 
recognized by the Court of Justice of the EU that, in general, the adoption of EU directives imposing 
minimum standards only gives rise to non-exclusive EU external competences to negotiate and adopt 
international agreements. It is also notable that although the Council of Europe environmental crime 
                                                
104 See also Pereira, supra n. 96. 
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convention lacks a ‘disconnection clause’ to preserve the EC/Union interests, this generally doesnot 
pose a challenge to the recognition of external powers of the EU member states.  
 This potential co-existence between the Council of Europe convention and the EU environmental 
crime directive means that those two instruments could be regarded as complementary, as is the case 
with other Council of Europe and EU multilateral criminal-law cooperation agreements.105 Indeed, the 
Council of Europe convention could potentially provide the framework for broader environmental 
criminal-law cooperation across the European continent (and potentially even globally), while the EU 
environmental crime directive provides the basis of cooperation among the EU member states. Yet in 
theevent of an incompatibility between the EU environmental crime directive with multilateral 
environmental agreements in general, the Intertanko judgment suggests that the Court of Justice of 
the EU may not review the legality of the directive because of its restrictive view of the extent to 
which the provisions of multilateral agreements are directly effective in the EU legal order. 
                                                
105 See the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption CETS No.: 173 and the EU Council 
Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on Combating Corruption in the Private Sector, OJ L328 (2003), at 54; 
OJC195/2 (1997); OJ L279/1 (1997); OJ L358/2 (1998); the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime CETS no. 185 and 
the EU Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA of 24 February 2005 on Attacks Against Information Systems, OJ L69 
(2005), at 67; and Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, Warsaw, 3 May 2005 
(CETS No. 197) and Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA of 19 July 2002 on Combating Trafficking in Human 
Beings, OJ L2003 (2002), at 2). 
 
